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Investment Performance of “Environmentally-Friendly” Firms and 
their Initial Public Offers and Seasoned Equity Offers 
 




We employ a sample of 748 environmentally-friendly (or “green”) firms listed on U.S. 
stock exchanges to extend studies of the effects of socially responsible investment 
(SRI) on stock investment returns and the performance of initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Our empirical tests document positive 
and statistically significant excess returns for our environmentally-friendly firms and 
their IPOs and SEOs, in contrast to our control sample IPOs and SEOs which 
underperform. In summary, a “green” equity premium is evident in returns calculated 
from a variety of benchmarks. 
 
JEL classifications: G14; G15; G39 
 






We investigate whether investment in environmentally friendly companies and their 
IPOs and SEOs is good for your wealth. We examine this issue empirically, because 
existing theory makes equivocal predictions. Our empirical results show that 
environmentally-friendly firms have positive risk-adjusted returns in the majority of 
our empirical investigations. In short, these investments are good for your 
(risk-adjusted) wealth. Our portfolios of environmentally-friendly firms outperform 
by seven per cent per annum. The frequently documented post-IPO performance 
decline is not present for environmentally-friendly IPOs, and the post-SEO drift is 
also not present. These drifts are however present in matched (control) samples of 
firms that do not qualify as environmentally-friendly.  
 
Two hypotheses are frequently investigated when SRI and conventional fund returns 
are compared; an underperformance hypothesis and an over-performance hypothesis. 
In support of arguments of having higher cost structures for environmentally-friendly 
practices, the underperformance hypothesis predicts that the risk-adjusted returns for 
the SRI funds should be lower than those of conventional funds because the 
investment opportunity set for SRI funds is restricted by non-financial criteria. SRI 
investors must accordingly be willing to accept suboptimal mean-variance efficient 
portfolios if they select companies with higher environmental, social responsibility, 
and corporate governance standards. This stock screening process violates classical 
finance theory which proposes that investors should maximize return subject to risk 
optimization. In contrast, the over-performance hypothesis indicates that this 
screening process may generate excess returns for SRI funds relative to conventional 
funds in the long run. The hypothesis argues that companies with higher corporate 
social responsibility standards can avoid potential costs of corporate social crises and 
environmental disasters. Hence, companies that ignore environmental responsibility 
may destroy long-term shareholder’s wealth due to reputation losses or potential 
litigation costs, or both. 
 
Prior studies have investigated the stock price movements associated with the 
environmental rankings. For example, Yamashita et al. (1999) report the relationship 
between environmental conscientiousness (EC) scores ranked by the 1993's Fortune 
magazine, and show that those companies with the worst EC scores have lower than 
average performance. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) observe significant positive 
returns for strong environmental management as indicated by environmental 
performance awards, and significant negative returns for weak environmental 
management, indicated by environmental crises. Derwall et al. (2004) employ a 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model based on "eco-efficiency" scores provided by 
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors and show that a portfolio of firms with high 
environmental scores outperformed a portfolio of firms with low scores by 6% per 
annum over the period 1997-2003. They argue that the market undervalues 
environmental news.  
 
Previous research in the area of social responsibility has focused on SRI fund returns 
and the majority of them have supported the underperforming hypothesis. For 
example, Hamilton et al. (1993) find that social responsible mutual funds do not earn 
statistically significant excess returns and that their performance is statistically 
indistinguishable from conventional mutual funds. Cohen et al. (1997) construct two 
industry-balanced portfolios and compare accounting and market returns for a “high 
polluter” and “low polluter” portfolio. Overall, they find either no “penalty” for 
investing in the environmentally-friendly portfolio, or a positive return from green 
investing. Bauer et al. (2005) document evidence of insignificant differences in 
risk-adjusted returns between ethical and conventional funds. They adopt the Carhart 
(1997) multi-factor model. They suggest that ethical mutual funds undergo a 
“catching up phase” before achieving financial returns similar to those of 
conventional funds. Geczy et al. (2005) compare SRI portfolios to those constructed 
from the broader fund universe and reveal that the costs of imposing a SRI constraint 
are substantial. Renneboog et al. (2008) document that SRI funds in the U.S., the U.K., 
and in many continental European and Asia-Pacific nations underperform their 
domestic benchmarks by between -2.2% and -6.5%.  
 
Instead of comparing returns of SRI funds and conventional funds, some papers 
investigate whether there is return difference in broad indexes. For instance, Sauer 
(1997) compares the raw and risk-adjusted performance of the Domini 400 Social 
Index (DSI) with two unrestricted, well-diversified benchmark portfolios and 
suggests that effect of social responsibility criteria on performance is negligible. 
Statman (2000) also finds that the DSI performs as well as S&P500. The risk-adjusted 
returns of the DSI are slightly lower than those of the S&P500, but the difference is 
not statistically significant.  
 
Contrary to the previous literature, our results support the over-performance 
hypothesis. This paper makes the following contributions to the existing literature: 
First, instead of comparing SRI and conventional fund returns, this paper constructs a 
pool of environmentally-friendly companies based on the constituents of 
environmental service indices or exchange-traded (ETF) funds listed on U.S. stock 
exchanges. This approach avoids the confounding effects of transaction costs and 
management fees that are prevalent when mutual fund returns are compared. While 
prior research (Derwall et al., 2004) obtains eco-efficiency scores for companies from 
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, we create a database based on publicly available 
information, thus reducing search costs for environmentally-oriented companies. We 
find that these portfolios, when investigated using a Carhart (1997) model, have seven 
percent excess returns per annum. 
 
Second, this paper extends the investigation of environmentally-friendly investment 
to IPOs and SEOs. We select “control” companies which are matched with our 
environmentally-friendly companies based on firm-specific characteristics. 
Astonishingly, long-term underperformance exists for the “control” sample, while no 
such evidence is found for our environmentally-friendly (or “green”) IPOs and SEOs. 
For example, the one-year BHARs for the environmentally-friendly and “control” 
IPOs are 12.4% and -7.1% respectively, while the one-year BHARs for the 
environmentally-friendly and “control” SEOs are 2.5% and -3.5% respectively, after 
controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum. A “green premium” exists 
primarily because environmentally-friendly investments have lower risks than 
“control” firms. 
 
Third, we perform cross-sectional regressions for the environmentally-friendly and 
“control” samples and test several IPO and SEO hypotheses that have been advanced 
to explain short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance. We include a 
“green” dummy variable and examine whether the environmentally-friendly sample 
behaves differently to the “control” sample. For the long-term performance, the 
coefficients for our environmentally-friendly proxy variable are always positive and 
statistically significant, while there is no evidence of short-term underpricing for our 
both IPO and SEO samples. 
 
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Data selection methods for the 
environmentally-friendly and “control” samples and empirical methods are described 
in Section 2. Section 3 presents the results for the portfolio returns for the 
environmentally-friendly companies. Section 4 presents the IPO and SEO results 
based on size, book-to-market, and momentum adjusted portfolios returns and 
cross-sectional regressions to explain both short-term and long-term equity returns. 
Conclusions and suggestions are offered in Section 5. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
2.1. Data selection 
 
We develop a comprehensive database of all environmental companies and their IPOs 
and SEOs in the period 1990 to 2012. Our environmentally-friendly observations are 
selected based on constituents in environmentally-friendly (or “green”) 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) or indices which are listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ. Our sample 
also considers stocks which are listed in global indices. However, we only study those 
global environmentally-oriented companies which are listed in the U.S in the form of 
common shares or American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Descriptions of each 
environmentally-friendly indices or exchange-traded funds are shown in the 
Appendix. A company is included as a sample observation if it is a constituent in one 
of the environmentally-friendly indices at the date this index is first published. Going 
forward in time, the company counts as a valid observation until it is dropped from the 
index. On the other hand, we retain an observation going backward in time for our 
return analysis if the observation does not change its Standard & Poor's Industry 
Classification Codes (SICCD). Since the earlier inception date of an environmentally 
friendly index is 12/31/1999, therefore, the return calculations in the pre-1999 period 
are returns for a sample of environmentally-friendly firms that are based on an 
assumption that if they were environmentally-friendly in 1999 (for example) and they 
do not change the fundamental nature of their SICs, then they are also 
environmentally friendly prior to 1999. The main reasons for adopting this 
back-dating approach are: (1) to extend the investigating period; (2) to allow us to 
calculate returns for longer investment horizons, let's say 3, 4, and 5 years; and (3) to 
ensure that we capture firms that form part of the portfolios of 
environmentally-friendly index service providers during periods in which such firms 
develop their environmental tracking record. We obtain stock return data and firm’s 
annual accounting information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
daily and monthly stock files and the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database 




In this sub-section, we present our approaches to measuring performance of 
environmentally-friendly companies and the long-run returns after their IPOs and 
SEOs. First, buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are based on equally-weighted 
market portfolios and portfolio benchmarks developed by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman 
and Wermers ((1997), henceforth DGTW)
1
. The DGTW method controls for the 
                                                 
1
 We briefly discuss the benchmark construction procedure here and refer the reader to DGTW for 
further details. We start with all stocks having book equity values listed in Compustat, and stock returns 
effects of size, book-to-market and momentum in computing abnormal long-run 
returns. The DGTW method is advocated as being superior to the two-factor (i.e., size 
and book-to-market) model of Fama and French (1992). The portfolios are 
reconstituted at the end of each June. 
 












       (1) 
 
where BHARk is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for k sets of comparison; ERit 
(CRit) is the buy-and-hold investment return for the event firm i and benchmark 
portfolio j at daily (or monthly) t. For each event window, a conventional t-statistic 
based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of the firm’s abnormal returns is 
calculated. The conventional t-statistic is defined as 
                                                                                                                                            
and market capitalization of equity listed in CRSP. We then rank these stocks based on their market 
capitalization and assign them to size quintiles (using NYSE size quintile breakpoints). Within each 
size quintile, we further rank stocks based on their book-to-market ratios (industry adjusted), and 
assign them to book-to-market quintiles, yielding a total of 25 size- and book-to-market sorted fractiles. 
We further sort stocks in each of these 25 fractiles into quintiles, based on the prior 12-month return of 
each stock. This results in a total of 125 fractiles; monthly benchmark portfolio returns are then 
computed as the value-weighted holding period buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of each of 
the 125 fractile portfolios. 
))(/)(/( nsqrtBHARBHARt ppBHAR           (2) 
 
where BHARp is the sample average and (BHARp) is the cross-sectional sample 
standard deviation of the BHARs for n firms. For panel data, Petersen (2009) notes 
that residuals may be correlated across firms or across time, and thus OLS measures 
can be biased. Therefore, we modify our approach and calculate clustered standard 





Second, this paper estimates long-run abnormal returns via a calendar-time portfolio 
approach based on Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model
3
. For each calendar month, we 
calculate the equally-weighted portfolio returns. The number of firms in the 
calendar-time portfolio varies from month to month. The calendar-time returns on 
these portfolios are then used to estimate the following regression: 
Rpt – Rft = αi +βi (Rmt – Rft) + si SMBt + hi HMLt + mi MOMt +εit    (3) 
                                                 
2
 To control for time and firm effects, Petersen (2009) clusters by firm and time in his two dimension 
setting. As “green” funds or index providers have adopted the “best-in-class” approach to select 
companies with good environment practices in each sector, we cluster the standard errors by industry 
(i.e., SICCD) and time in order to fit our selection criteria. 
3
 The advantages of adopting the calendar-time portfolio approach are discussed in Barber and Lyon 
(1997) and Barber et al. (1999). 
 
where Rpt is the monthly return on the equally-weighted calendar-time portfolio, Rft is 
the monthly return on the risk-free asset; Rmt is the return on the value-weighted 
market portfolio; SMBt is the difference in returns of value-weighted portfolios of 
small stocks and big stocks; HMLt is the difference in returns of value-weighted 
portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks; MOMt is the 
difference in returns of value-weighted portfolios of high-momentum and 
low-momentum stocks. The estimate of the intercept term (αi) provides a test of the 
null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is 
zero. 
 
For the cross-sectional regressions on equity returns, we analyze whether 
underpricing and long-term stock return underperformance, which are documented by 
most prior IPO and SEO studies, are present in the environmentally-friendly and 
“control” samples. For short-term performance of IPOs and SEOs, we estimate the 
following regression: 
Underpricingi (SEO Discounti) =α1+β2ln(amt)i+β3Ranki +β4Revisioni +β5(NUM)i 
 +β6RETi+β7Bubblei+β8Techi +β9EPSi +β10NYSEi 
 +β11ADRi +β12GREENi +ε;     (4) 
 
For long-term performance of the IPOs and SEOs, we estimate the following 
regression: 
BHARt = α1+β2ln(at)i +β3Underpricingi (SEO Discounti) +β4Ranki 
+β5Revisioni 
 +β6(NUM)i +β7RETi+β8Bubblei +β9Techi +β10EPSi +β11NYSEi 
 +β12ADRi +β13GREENi +ε;         (5) 
 
where Underpricingi (SEO Discounti) is measured from the offer price to the first-day 
closing price; BHARt is the buy-and-hold abnormal return based DGTW benchmarks; 
Amti (millions of dollars) is the dollar value of the amount of stock sold in the offering; 
Ranki is the rank of the lead underwriter using Loughran and Ritter (2004)
4
; following 
Hanley (1993), Revisioni is the difference between the offer price and midpoint of the 
initial filing price relative to the mid-point of the initial filing range. Many authors 
suggest that the frequency of IPOs/SEOs and the magnitude of underpricing tends to 
increase during a bull market. To consider the economic and market conditions at the 
time of the filing, we include two control variables: NUMi and RETi which calculate 
                                                 
4
 Ranki is defined as the maximum rank if there is more than one underwriter. Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989) present a model in which underwriters induce investors (or subscribers) to honestly reveal their 
information regarding the true value of the securities being issued prior to the final pricing. 
the number of firms going public or issuing additional equity during the 30 days, 
whereas RETi is the BHAR based on value-weighted market portfolios benchmarks 
three months prior to the offer date for an IPO or SEO. Ritter and Welch (2002) report 
that the average underpricing increases dramatically during the internet bubble. To 
account for the especially high initial returns during this period we include a dummy 
variable Bubblei which is equal to one if the offer date occurs during 1999 and 2000, 
and zero otherwise. According to information asymmetry theories, initial returns will 
be higher for riskier firms, which suggest that firms in technology industries will be 
more underpriced. Therefore, we include a dummy variable Techi which is equal to 
one if the firm is in a high technology industry as identified by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004); EPSi is equal to one if the earnings per share is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise; NYSEi is equal to one if the IPO/SEO firm is listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange; A portion of stocks included in the environmentally-oriented IPO and SEO 
samples are overseas companies. In order to capture the potential impact of non-U.S. 
domiciled firms on our results as suggested by Bell et al. (2012). We include a dummy 
variable ADRi which is equal to one if the non-U.S. domiciled firm is listed on the U.S. 
stock exchanges in the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs); Greeni is 
equal to one if the IPO/ SEO firm is defined as an environmentally-friendly IPO /SEO, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
3. Return analysis of the environmentally-friendly sample 
 
Panel A of Table 1 reports BHARs based on DGTW benchmarks for the 
environmentally-friendly sample. The environmentally-friendly sample grows from 
363 observations in 1990 to 736 observations in 2012. The excess returns are not 
positive and statistically significant every year; thus the so-called “green” premium is 
not persistent across time. For example, the median and mean BHAR in 1998 was 
-15.6% and -4.9%, respectively and statistically significant positive excess returns do 
not exist in 1995-99. However, positive excess returns are found in the latest period 
where the average BHAR between 2000 and 2010 is 14.2%.  
<< Please insert Table 1>> 
 
Panel B of Table 1 applies the Carhart (1997) four-factor model for monthly returns 
for our portfolios of environmentally-friendly companies. We further partition our 
samples into different periods to investigate whether the persistence of green 
premium exists over time. Panel B depicts results that suggest the 
environmentally-friendly sample performed better than the portfolio benchmark; 
alpha is 0.62 percent per month (the t-statistic is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level). The environmentally-friendly (or “green”) beta is 1.02. The 
coefficients for SMB and HML are 0.37 and 0.30 respectively, both of which are 
significant, implying that the environmentally-friendly portfolio has an exposure to 
smaller growth-oriented stocks. Renneboog et al. (2011) find that ethical money 
chases past returns, however, our results do not support this argument because the 
momentum factor is negative and statistically significant.  
 
Bebchuk et al. (2013) and Borgers et al. (2013) both suggest that the positive 
abnormal returns due to errors in investors' expectations will be ceased as attention for 
such information increased. Our findings support this argument. For instance, in the 
Panel A of Table 1, the BHARs for 2011 and 2012 are -0.051 (t-statistic -4.54) and 
0.005 (t-statistic 0.37), respectively. On the other hand, the alpha in Cahart four-factor 
model drops to 0.39 per month in the period of 2005-2012, which is somewhat lower 
than 0.67 per month in the period of 2000-2012. Hence, our findings support the view 
that over time learning takes place and the errors in investors' expectations diminish. 
 
To conclude, our results in Table 2 suggest positive excess returns for our 
environmentally-oriented companies. The results so far are based on classifications 
that can be made from publicly available information; accordingly developing 
portfolios of environmentally-friendly investments does not involve high search costs, 
which gives us a strong motivation to use the environmentally-friendly sample to 
investigate questions relating to IPO and SEO financing. We now turn to these 
matters. 
 
4. Event studies: IPOs and SEOs 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics for environmentally-friendly and “Control” firms 
 
Table 2 presents summary descriptive statistics for environmentally-friendly and 
“control” IPO and SEO firms for the period 1990-2012. The environmentally-friendly 
IPO and SEO companies are defined in the Appendix. “Control” IPO and SEO 
companies are constructed by matching on (i) time of the capital raising, (ii) industry 
sectors, and (iii) market capitalization. In order to fulfill this requirement, the 
environmentally-friendly and “control” IPO and SEO firms must be listed in the same 
month and year. In addition, “control” firms are selected from the same 3-digit 
industry codes as environmentally-friendly firms. If a corresponding “control” firm 
cannot be found, the same 2-digit industry codes are used. Firms are matched on size 
using the firm closest in size in the range of 25% and 200% of the 
environmentally-friendly firm’s size, measured at the end of each year. The 
Underpricing or SEO discount is measured from the offer price to the first-day 
closing price. Amount (millions of dollars) is the dollar value of the amount of stock 
sold in the offering. Money left on the table (millions of dollars) is calculated as the 
number of shares issued times the change from the offer price to the first-day closing 
price. Following Hanley (1993), we define Revision as the difference between the 
offer price and midpoint of the initial filing price scaled by the mid-point of the initial 
filing range. Underwriter Rank is the rank of the lead underwriter as adopted by 
Loughran and Ritter (2004). These rankings are on a zero to nine scales, with nine 
representing the most reputable underwriters. Dilution is the reduction in the 
ownership percentage of current investors, founders, and employees caused by the 
issuance of new shares. Gross spread is defined as total expenses (underwriting fees, 
management fees, re-allowances and selling concessions) as a percentage of total 
proceeds. EPS (cents) is the earnings per share for the fiscal year prior to the offer date. 
The PE ratio is the market price divided by EPS for the fiscal year prior to the offer 
date.
5
 IPONUM (SEONUM) is the number of firms going public (issuing equity) 
during the previous 30 days. In order to control for the market movement prior to an 
IPO, Cook et al. (2006) compute the NASDAQ return prior to the offering date. 
Instead, we define RET as the BHARs based on the value-weighted market portfolios 
benchmarks three months prior to the offer date for an IPO or SEO. 
                                                 
5
 If EPS is negative we do not calculate a PE ratio and thus treat the observation as missing. 
<< Please insert Table 2>> 
 
For the samples of IPOs, there is clear evidence of underpricing, with the initial 
returns for the environmentally-friendly and “control” IPOs being 15.57% and 
16.10%, respectively. The dollar value of the amount of stock sold in an 
environmentally-friendly offering is more than that of “control” firms. Similar results 
pertain to money left on the table. Environmentally-friendly IPOs attract 
higher-reputation investment banks for their IPOs, and these banks charge lower 
underwriting fees, resulting in a lower gross spread
6
. Interestingly, the median and 
mean EPS for environmentally-friendly firms are 0.49 and 0.31, respectively, which 
suggest that environmentally-oriented companies are profitable stocks. 
 
When environmentally-friendly firms go back to the market with a SEO the offer 
price has doubled compared to the IPO offer price. Shares are fairly priced with no 
money left on the table. Subscribers are less willing to buy both 
environmentally-friendly and “control” SEOs, but they still prefer 
environmentally-friendly SEOs than “control” SEOs, as indicated by a lower price 
                                                 
6
 As shown in Table 2, the medians gross spread for our "green" and “control” IPO samples are 7.0%. 
This result is consistent with the findings in Cliff and Dennis (2004) which show that underwriter 
spreads in IPOs are clustered at 7% for all but the very smallest and very largest offerings. 
revision for environmentally-friendly SEOs. Similar to the IPO results, 
environmentally-friendly SEOs use more prestigious underwriters, who again have a 
lower gross spread. The mean EPS for the environmentally-friendly SEOs has tripled 
compared that of IPO firms.  
 
4.2. BHARs for IPOs and SEOs 
 
The post-IPO and post-SEO BHARs based on DGTW (1997) portfolios are presented 
in the Panels A and B of Table 3, respectively. We calculate one month and up to five 
years post-event returns after IPOs and SEOs. The main finding of Table 3 is that the 
“control” sample of IPO stocks underperform in the long-run. However, surprisingly, 
positive and statistically significant excess stock returns are observed for the 
environmentally-friendly IPO stocks after listing. The median and mean of the 
1-month BHARs are 1.3% and 3.8%, respectively. For investors who purchase 
environmentally-oriented stocks through the IPOs and sell the stocks one year after 
listing, they make 12.4% excess returns on average. The median of the one year return 
is 8.1%. The divergence of median and mean return series is more severe in the 
long-run horizons, as the 5-year median and mean are 9.1% and 49.7%, respectively. 
The large return differential between median and mean returns indicates that the 
return distribution is positively skewed. For the “control” IPO sample, no statistically 
significant abnormal returns are encountered in short-term horizons. However, 
underperformance of IPO “control” stocks is found in the long-run. The 1-year, 3-year, 
and 5-year post-IPO returns are -7.1%, -15.6% and -7.8% with t-statistics-2.53, -3.52 
and -1.15, respectively. In contrast to environmentally-friendly IPO stocks, the return 
distribution for the “non-green” IPO stocks is negative skewed. The return differential 
between environmentally-friendly and “control” samples diverge from 3.4% one 
month after listing to 57.5% for a five-year investment horizon. Additional tests 
reveal that the differences in mean returns between the environmentally-friendly and 
“control” stocks are significantly different from zero in all time partitions, with the 
sole exception being the 1-month period. 
<<Please insert Table 3>> 
 
In Panel B of Table 3, positive and statistically significant abnormal returns are also 
found for environmentally-friendly SEO stocks. The 1-month BHAR is 0.2% after a 
new issuance of stock. For subscribers who purchase environmentally-oriented stocks 
through an SEO and hold them for five years, they earn 22.1% excess returns on 
average. Similar with the “control” IPOs, underperformance of SEO “control” stocks 
is observed one year after listing. The 1-year, 3-year and 5-year BHARs for the 
“control” sample are -3.5% (t-statistic -2.91), -11.3% (t-statistic-5.55) and -10.5% 
(t-statistic -3.95), respectively; these results are consistent with earlier studies. The 
z-statistics also suggest that the environmentally-friendly SEO sample is significantly 
different to the “control” SEO sample in the long run. 
 
In summary, both environmentally-friendly IPOs and SEOs yield positive excess 
returns in the long run, while the “control” IPOs and SEOs do not. Our results support 
the Over-performance Hypothesis which implies that investors believe companies 
with higher environmental standards can create long-term shareholder value; 
therefore, they perform better than non-environmental companies. We find “green” 
premiums for both IPOs and SEOs. 
 
4.3. Cross-sectional regressions for IPOs and SEOs 
 
In this section, we investigate whether the “green” premium still exists after 
controlling for other factors by performing cross-sectional regressions with equity 
returns for the environmentally-friendly IPO and SEO samples as the dependent 
variable. In Table 4, we include dummy control variables
7
, and test several IPO and 
                                                 
7
 The control dummy variables are Bubblei, Techi, EPSi, NYSEi, and ADRi. The predicted signs for the 
coefficients of variables Bubblei and Techi are positive, since it is hard to evaluate the intrinsic values of 
the IPO firms listed during the IT bubble period and technology firms normally have more intangible 
assets and more risk. Profitable IPO/SEO firms and firms listed on the NYSE should have less 
SEO hypotheses which have been shown by previous literature to explain IPO and 
SEO underpricing (in Panel A of Table 4) and the long-term IPO and SEO 
underperformance (in Panels B and C of Table 4), respectively. We run a multivariate 
regression with all possible explanatory variables to investigate whether 
environmentally-friendly firms are dominant in explaining IPO and SEO effects. 
 
In Panel A of Table 4, the dependent variable is Underpricingi / SEO Discounti, which 
is measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price and the variable of 
interest is the dummy variable Greeni, which is equal to one if the listing firm or 
additional issuing firm is classified as an environmentally-friendly IPO/ SEO. The 
variable ln(amt)i captures the size effect. To attract investors to subscribe for a large 
amount of stock sold in the offering, higher discounts might be offered to subscribers. 
Therefore, a negative coefficient is expected for the variable ln(amt)i. Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) argue that underwriter rank should be positively related to underpricing 
because issuers want to attract the best underwriters who will underprice and allocate 
the IPO shares to current or potential future investment banking clients. Subscribers 
show their intention to subscribe for IPO/ SEO shares during the book-building 
                                                                                                                                            
underpricing, therefore, the predicted sign for both coefficients of variables EPSi, and NYSEi should be 
negative. No prediction for the coefficient of variable ADRi, as the potential SRI impact on the non-U.S. 
domiciled firms is not known. 
process (see for example, Benveniste and Spindt (1989)). If the offer price is near the 
top of the initial filing price range, this implies that subscribers are willing to acquire 
the IPO/ SEO shares at a relatively high offering price. If the demand for the IPO/ 
SEO shares is high, the proportion of shares allocated to subscribers will be small. 
Subscribers might, in such circumstances, purchase “hot” IPOs/SEOs in the 
aftermarket and boost the share price. Therefore, the predicted sign for the coefficient 
of variable Revisioni should be positive for IPOs/ SEOs with higher price revisions 
during the book-building process. Finally, many authors have suggested that the 
frequency of IPOs and the overall stock-market returns before the IPO listings are 
positively related to underpricing (see, for example, Hanley (1993) and Loughran and 
Ritter (2004)). In order to test the market timing hypothesis suggested by Jain and 
Kini (1994), the independent variables NUMi and RETi reflect whether the issue was 
made during a bull market. 
<< Please insert Table 4>> 
 
In Panel A of Table 4, the coefficients for the dummy variable Greeni are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, there is no evidence of statistically different 
underpricing for our environmentally-friendly IPO and SEO samples. In the IPO test, 
consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon indicated by the previous 
literature, the coefficient of variable Revisioni has the predicted sign and is 
statistically significant at 1% level
8
. For the dummy variables, the coefficients for the 
variable Bubblei and EPSi are positive and statistically significant at a 1% level. 
Therefore, we observe some evidence of higher underpricing for technology firms and 
lower underpricing for firms listed on the NYSE in our regressions. In the SEO test, 
we also find that there is no positive relationship between underpricing and the 
frequency of SEOs
9
. Inconsistent with the previous literature, the coefficient of the 
variable Ranki is negative and statistically significant at 5% level and partial 
adjustment phenomenon cannot be explained for the short-term underpricing.   
. 
Panel B presents the cross-sectional regression results for the long-term performance 
of IPOs. Similar to Panel A, we adopt the same explanatory variables in these 
regressions. Furthermore, we include the variable Underpricingi as an independent 
variable in order to explore the relationship between short-term underpricing and 
                                                 
8
 To examine the relationship between underpricing and price revision, we include the interaction 
terms in the multivariate regression (not shown in Table 4), except for the term (GREEN*Revision) 
which is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, all other interaction terms with the green 
dummy are not statistically significant, which implies that the effects of higher price revision and more 
underpricing will be diminished in the presence of a “green” IPO.  
9
 The coefficient of the interaction term (Green*RET) is negative and statistically significant at 5% 
level, which implies that the effects of market timing hypothesis will be reduced in the presence of a 
“green” SEO. 
long-term stock return performance. Our results in Panel B suggest that the “green” 
IPO premium exists and is persistent over time. Starting from 6-month event window 
of interest, the coefficients for Greeni are positive and statistically significant, which 
reflects that the “green” factor is an important determinant of future stock price 
performance. There is an evidence of a negative relationship between long-term stock 
return performance and amount of issuance, while there is a positive association 
between underwriters’ ranking and long-term BHARs. Our results also support the 
marking timing hypothesis, as expressed by the variable NUMi.  Furthermore, NYSE 
listed IPOs perform better than non-NYSE listed IPOs, while the IPOs which are 
listed during the internet bubble period are performed better in the long run. The 
coefficient for the variable EPSi is only positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level for the 1-month and 60-month event window of interest, while for the other 




                                                 
10
 Previous research has argued about directional causation between environmental performance and 
firm profitability (i.e., some scholars suggest that firms adopting higher environmental standards can 
avoid potential costs of environmental disasters, therefore, they generate higher profits; while others 
argue that only high profit generating firms can implement stringent environmental standards, as 
additional costs are incurred by adopting environmental policies). However, we cannot draw a final 
 
In Panel C of Table 4, we present cross-sectional regression results for the long-term 
performance of SEOs. The main variable of interest is again Greeni. We find that the 
coefficients for Greeni are positive and statistically significant. For example, while 
holding other factors constant, the environmentally-friendly SEOs earn 12.8% and 
16.8% more than the “control” sample in the 2-year and 3-year investigating periods, 
respectively. However, with the exception of 3-month period, the coefficients for the 
variable EPSi are positive but not statistically significant for both the short-term and 
long-term horizons; which imply that a “green” premium can exist in the absence of 
positive earnings. The variables Underpricingi are positive and statistically 
significant in all investigation periods, while the variable NUMi is negative and 
statistically significant, which supports the market timing hypothesis. Moreover, in 
the short-term horizon, there is evidence that the rank of the SEO lead underwriter and 
upward adjustment of the filing SEO offer prices can explain the stock return 
performance. In conclusion, our results in Table 4 reveal that an investor can earn 12% 
excess return if he/she can clearly distinguish “green” and “non-green” stocks and 
                                                                                                                                            
conclusion on the causal relationship between environmental performance and firm profitability based 
on our regression results.  
  





A social responsibility index typically has three components: environment, social and 
corporate governance. There is an abundant literature investigating the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance (see for example, Bebchuk et al. 
(2013)), while some authors have compared the returns of conventional funds with 
socially responsible mutual funds (see for example, Hamilton et al. (1993), Cohen et 
al. (1997), Bauer et al. (2005), Geczy et al. (2005), and Renneboog et al. (2008)) or the 
returns in broad indexes (see for example, Sauer (1997) and Statman (2000)). This 
paper extends the literature on environmental-oriented companies into the corporate 
finance topics of IPOs and SEOs. 
 
The prior literature proposed two hypotheses in explaining stock return performance 
of environmentally-friendly companies. The underperformance hypothesis suggests 
that environmentally-friendly companies will underperform in the short-run because 
their investment opportunity set is restricted by non-financial criteria. In order to 
fulfill higher environmental standards, extra costs are incurred in designing clean 
technology systems and manufacturing environmentally-friendly products. However, 
in the long-run, companies with higher environmental standards can avoid the 
potential costs of corporate social crises and environmental disasters. This is valuable 
not only to shareholders, but also benefits other stakeholders, namely employees, 
customers, local communities and the environment. Thus, environmentally-friendly 
companies will over-perform in the long-run (i.e., the over-performance hypothesis). 
 
Based on publicly available information, we identify 748 environmentally-friendly 
companies being constituents of environmental indices listed on the NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ during the period 1990-2012. Consistent with the results in Derwall et 
al. (2004), our Carhart (1997) four-factor model shows that environmentally-friendly 
companies earn seven percent excess returns per year. The previous literature has 
documented long-term underperformance of IPOs and SEOs. Astonishingly, we 
observe positive and statistically significant BHARs for our environmentally-friendly 
IPOs and SEOs in both short-term and long-term horizon tests. For instance, we find 
that the one-year BHARs for environmentally-friendly and “control” IPOs are 12.4% 
and -7.1%, respectively, while the one-year BHARs for environmentally-friendly and 
“control” SEOs are 2.5% and -3.5% after controlling for size, book-to-market, and 
momentum factors. From our cross-sectional regressions, the underpricing of 
environmentally-friendly IPOs and SEOs does not differ significantly from “control” 
firms. The long-term performance tests show that the “green” dummy variable is 
always positive and statistically significant; thus a “green” factor is important in 
explaining long-term stock return performance flowing SEOs. Our results support the 
over-performance hypothesis that proposes companies with higher environmental 
standards create shareholders’ wealth in the long run. Hence, a “green” premium 
exists and persists over time.  
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Table 1 –Return analysis of the “green” sample 
In Panel A, we calculate BHARs based on the size, book-to-market, and momentum adjusted portfolios 
for the “green” sample with prices available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
historical daily stock price data and COMPUSTAT historical annually industrial and accounting data. 
The “green” companies are constituents from one of the environmentally-friendly exchange-traded 
funds defined in the Appendix. In Panel B, we estimate four-factor regressions of equal-weighted 
monthly returns for portfolios of “green” companies. The explanatory variables are RMRF, SMB, HML, 
and Mom. These variables are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, 
book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively. The sample period is from January 1990 through 
December 2012.  
 
Panel A: The BHARs based on size, book-to-market, and momentum on a yearly basis 
Year Obs. Median Mean S.D. t-statistic 
1990 363 0.018 0.066 0.391     3.22 *** 
1991 380 0.039 0.145 0.487     5.81 *** 
1992 414 0.058 0.127 0.441     5.84 *** 
1993 442 0.044 0.119 0.400     6.24 *** 
1994 467 0.013 0.049 0.413     2.55 ** 
1995 488 -0.038 0.029 0.641     0.99 
1996 512 -0.009 0.028 0.393     1.59 
1997 542 0.001 0.056 0.523     2.45* 
1998 566 -0.156 -0.049 0.671    -1.72 
1999 586 -0.198 0.057 1.251     1.10 
2000 606 0.249 0.357 0.772    11.37*** 
2001 627 0.139 0.244 0.628     9.72 *** 
2002 633 0.130 0.129 0.472     6.85 *** 
2003 641 0.023 0.182 0.575     8.03 *** 
2004 664 0.056 0.099 0.322     7.93 *** 
2005 683 0.011 0.091 0.535     4.46 *** 
2006 709 0.015 0.046 0.287     4.24 *** 
2007 743 -0.006 0.097 0.534     4.96 *** 
2008 748 0.019 0.026 0.438     1.64 * 
2009 738 0.021 0.218 0.892     6.63 *** 
2010 741 0.024 0.075 0.354     5.78 *** 
2011 738 -0.025 -0.051 0.306    -4.54 *** 
2012 736 -0.011 0.005 0.353     0.37 
t-statistic that the BHAR equals zero.***, **and * significant at  = 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively 
(two-tail test). 
 
Panel B: Cahart four-factor regressions for the “green” portfolios 
R(Green)-RF(t) α RMRF(t) SMB(t) HML(t) Mom(t) Adj-R2 
All Sample 0.62 *** 1.02***  0.37***  0.30***  -0.12***  94.0% 
(1990-2012) (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)   
       
1995-2012 0.57 *** 1.02 *** 0.38 *** 0.34 *** -0.13 *** 94.0% 
 (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)   
       
2000-2012 0.67 *** 1.03 *** 0.34 ***  0.36 *** -0.11 ***  93.7% 
 (0.12)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)   
       
2005-2012 0.39 *** 1.13 ***  0.53 *** -0.04  -0.12 *** 96.8% 
 (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.02)   
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at  = 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels is indicated 
by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
Table 2 –Descriptive statistics for “green” and “control” samples 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for “green” and “control” samples of IPOs and SEOs, 
respectively. Underpricing (SEO discount) is measured from the offer price to the first-day closing 
price. Amount (millions of dollars) is the dollar value of the amount of stock sold in the offering. 
Money left on the table (millions of dollars) is calculated as the number of shares issued times the 
change from the offer price to the first-day closing price. Revision is the difference between the offer 
price and mid-point of the initial filing price relative to the mid-point of the initial filing range. 
Underwriter Rank is the rank of the lead underwriter using Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster ranking, 
where nine is the highest rank and one is the lowest rank. Dilution is the reduction in the ownership 
percentage of current investors, founders, and employees caused by the issuance of new shares. Gross 
spread is defined as total expenses (underwriting fees, management fees, re-allowances and selling 
concessions) as a percentage of total proceeds. EPS (cents) is the earnings per share for the fiscal year 
prior to the offer date. PE ratio is the price divided by EPS for the fiscal year prior to the offer date. 
IPONUM (SEONUM) is the number of firms going public (issuing equity) during the previous 30 days; 
RET is the BHAR based on the value-weighted market portfolios benchmarks three months prior to the 
offer date for an IPO or SEO. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for “green” and “control” samples of IPOs 
 
 Green Sample  Control Sample  
 Median Mean S.D.  Median Mean S.D. z-test 
Offer price (dollars) 15.00  15.83  5.28   15.00  15.22  4.84    3.00***  
Underpricing (%) 9.81  15.57  21.98   8.61  16.10  29.02    -0.11  
Amount (millions) 97.75  183.91  241.05   84.60  135.11  135.85   39.28*** 
Money left on the table 
(millions) 
7.88  26.14  51.04  
 
2.97  7.22  46.16   29.88*** 
Revision (%) 0.00  -0.33  9.44   0.00  0.54  9.03    -0.31  
Underwriter rank 9.00  8.42  1.02   9.00  8.22  1.28   1.99** 
Dilution (%) 21.59  22.98  14.45   27.29  32.75  21.30   -22.84***  
Gross spread (%) 7.00  6.42  0.95   7.00  6.55  0.87   -1.45  
EPS (dollars) 0.49  0.31  0.97   0.34  0.14  1.52    1.60  
PE ratio 23.98  36.37  40.16   23.16  33.71  32.11    3.68*** 
IPONUM 36.00  39.88  22.92   34.50  39.57  23.04    0.71  
RET (%) 2.96  2.96 4.52   2.79  2.80  4.57    0.08  
         
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the “green” and “control” samples of SEOs 
 Green Sample  Control Sample  
 Median Mean S.D.  Median Mean S.D. z-test 
Offer price (dollars) 28.00  31.12  19.13   24.75  26.91  16.53    23.61***  
SEO discount(%) 1.13  2.37  4.36   0.63  1.93  4.27     0.46  
Amount (millions) 148.40  250.10  276.62   129.55  203.65  208.70    70.81***  
Money left on the table 
(millions) 
0.75  -2.93  38.47  
 
0.00  -37.89  115.24    92.69*** 
Revision (%) -2.41  -3.04  9.33   -3.10  -3.69  9.33     0.51  
Underwriter rank 9.00  8.52  0.82   9.00  8.32  0.96     4.76  
Dilution (%) 6.42  8.14  6.31   10.14  12.62  9.17   -32.91***  
Gross spread (%) 4.00  3.94  1.37   4.50  4.28  1.30    -6.39***  
EPS (dollars) 1.04  1.03  1.39   0.88  0.78  1.55     4.52*** 
PE ratio 21.49  26.85  17.33   20.54  26.40  21.46     1.84* 
SEONUM 52.00  53.75  22.40   53.00  54.02  22.99    -1.32  
RET (%) 3.73  3.42  6.46   3.66  3.45  6.21    -0.03  
         
Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Table 3 –BHARs for the sample of IPOs and SEOs 
Post-announcement BHARs based on size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolios with prices 
available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) historical daily stock price data are 
presented. The “green” IPO and SEO companies are constituents of one of the environmental services 
indices defined in the Appendix. The “control” IPO and SEO companies are constructed by matching 
on the market capitalization at the time of issuance. For each event window of interest, a conventional 
t-statistic based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of rated firms’ abnormal returns is calculated. 
The level of significance on the abnormal returns calculated by BHARs based on the size, 
book-to-market, and momentum portfolio returns is tested. The z-statistic based on the differences in 
mean returns is also presented. The numbers of “green” IPOs and SEOs are 241 and 1124, respectively. 
 
Panel A: The “green” and “control” samples of IPOs 
(i) The “green” sample of IPOs  
Periods 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 48-month 60-month 
Median 0.013 0.033 0.078 0.081 0.057 0.099 0.068 0.091 
Mean 0.038 0.083 0.125 0.124 0.278 0.386 0.482 0.497 
S.D. 0.146 0.284 0.385 0.506 0.917 1.145 1.400 1.400 
t-statistic 4.02*** 4.54***  5.03***  3.75***  4.55***  4.94***  4.98***  5.08***  
(ii) The “control” sample of IPOs  
Median 0.004 -0.022 -0.023  -0.094 -0.293 -0.307 -0.315 -0.306 
Mean 0.004 -0.005 -0.031  -0.071 -0.188 -0.156 -0.114 -0.078 
S.D. 0.123 0.230 0.316  0.418 0.519 0.575 0.678 0.765 
t-statistic 0.50  -0.30  -1.49  -2.53** -5.08***  -3.52***  -2.04**  -1.15  
         
Difference 0.034 0.088 0.130 0.195 0.466 0.541 0.597 0.575 
z-statistic 1.00  1.88* 3.06***  3.07***  5.69***  5.79***  5.61***  5.07**  
Panel B: The “green” and “control” sample of SEOs 
(i) The “green” sample of SEOs  
Periods 1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 48-month 60-month 
Median -0.004 0.008 0.015 0.000 -0.007 0.011 0.036 0.047 
Mean 0.002 0.018 0.022 0.025 0.052 0.098 0.159 0.221 
S.D. 0.104 0.171 0.256 0.354 0.511 0.591 0.687 0.791 
t-statistic 0.57  3.46*** 2.81***  2.34**  3.23***  5.07***  6.60***  7.79***  
(ii) The “control” sample of SEO  
Median -0.009 -0.013 -0.017 -0.044 -0.146 -0.165 -0.191 -0.180 
Mean 0.002 -0.007 -0.016 -0.035 -0.114 -0.113 -0.132 -0.105 
S.D. 0.121 0.178 0.265 0.365 0.455 0.538 0.548 0.590 
t-statistic 0.60  -1.19  -1.86*  -2.91*** -7.08*** -5.55***  -5.63***  -3.95***  
         
Difference -0.001  0.025  0.038  0.061  0.166  0.212  0.290  0.326  
z-statistic -0.04  1.34  1.67*  2.24**  5.06***  5.64***  6.77***  6.93***  
         
t-statistic (z-statistic) that the BHAR equals zero (i.e., that the (green-control) BHAR is different from zero).***, 
**and * Significant at   = 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively (two-tail test).  
 
Table 4 –Short-term and long-term performance of IPOs/SEOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns 
 
This Table presents regression results from estimating the following equations:  
 
Underpricingt /SEO Discountt  = α1+β2ln(amt)+β3Rank+β4Revision+β5NUM+β6RET+β7Bubble+β8Tech+β9EPS+β10NYSE 
        +β11ADR +β12Green +ε 
 
BHARt      = α1+β2ln(amt)+β3(Underpricing/SEO Discount)+β4Rank+β5Revision+β6NUM +β7RET   
       +β8Bubble +β9Tech +β10EPS +β11NYSE+β12ADR +β13Green +ε; 
 
where Underpricingt /SEO Discountt is measured from the offer price to the first-day closing price; BHARt is the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
based on size, book-to-market and momentum portfolios benchmarks; Amt (millions of dollars) is the dollar value of the amount of stock sold 
in the offering; Revision is the difference between the offer price and midpoint of the initial filing price relative to the mid-point of the initial 
filing range; Rank is the rank of the lead underwriter using Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster ranking; Bubble is equal to one if the offer date 
occurs during 1999 and 2000, and zero otherwise; Tech is equal to one if the firm is in a high technology industry as identified by Loughran and 
Ritter (2004); EPS is equal to one if the earning per share is greater than zero, and zero otherwise; NYSE is equal to one if the IPO/SEO firm is 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange; NUM is the number of firms going public or undergoing seasoned equity offerings during the previous 
30 days; RET is the BHARs based on the value-weighted market portfolios benchmarks three months prior to the offer date for an IPO/SEO; 
ADR is equal to one if the observation is the American Depository Receipt (ADR), and zero otherwise; Green is equal to one if the IPO/SEO 
firm is defined as a green IPO/SEO, zero otherwise. Standard errors based on Petersen (2009) and modified by clustering by industry and year 
are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Panel A show the 
short-term performance of the IPOs and SEOs, while The BHARs based on different time windows of interest for the IPO and SEO samples are 
presented in Panel B and Panel C, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Short-term performance of IPOs/SEOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns 
 










































































Panel B: long-term performance of IPOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns 









































































































































































































































Panel C: long-term performance of SEOs: Cross-sectional regression on equity returns 















































































































































































48-month -0.042 -0.054 0.995** 0.018 0.257 -0.002 -0.417 -0.058 0.003 0.081 0.148** 0.230* 0.231*** 5.05% 
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Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Appendix – The major environmentally-friendly exchange-traded (ETF) funds listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 




Ticker Nos. of  
Stocks 
Indices (Listing Date) Descriptions  
AdvisorShares Global Echo 
ETF (IPO -24 May 2012) 
GIVE 74  GIVE is a multi-manager, multi-strategy, broadly diversified, and actively managed ETF with a focus on Sustainable Investing. The 
fund invests primarily in U.S. and foreign equity securities. The Fund may take both long and short positions.  
Claymore- LGA Green ETF GRN 179 Eco*IndexTM Index 
(10 Oct 2006) 
GRN designs to capture the performance of U.S. listed large-cap companies for their having better than average environmental 
performance relative to their industry peers. The initial benchmark value is 1000.00 at close of trading October 10, 2006. 
First Trust Global Wind Energy 
ETF  
FAN 51 ISE Global Wind Energy 
Index (06 Jun 2008) 
FAN will invest at least 90% of its net assets (plus the amount of any borrowings for investment purposes) in common stocks that 
comprise the index or in depositary receipts representing securities in the index. FAN invests in sectors, which include Consumer 
Discretionary, Energy, Industrials, materials and Utilities.  
First Trust ISE Water Index 
Fund  
FIW 36 ISE Water Index  
(20 Nov 2006) 
FIW consists of 36 stocks that derive a substantial portion of their revenues from the potable and wastewater industries. FIW invests at 
least 90% of its assets in common stocks that comprise the index. 
First Trust NASDAQ Clean 
Edge Green Energy Index Fund  
QCLN 43 Clean Edge U.S. Liquid 
Series Index (17 Nov 2006) 
QCLN invests on the companies that are primarily manufacturers, developers, distributors and/or installers of clean energy 
technologies, as defined by Clean Edge. 
First Trust NASDAQ Clean 
Edge Smart Grid Infrastructure 
Index Fund  
GRID 31 NASDAQ OMX Clean Edge 
Smart Grid Infrastructure 
Index (22 Sep 2009) 
GRID is designed to track the performance of common stocks in the grid and electric energy infrastructure sector. The fund includes 
companies that are primarily engaged and involved in electric grid, electric meters and devices, networks, energy storage and 
management, and enabling software used by the smart grid infrastructure sector. 
Guggenheim S&P Global Water 
Index ETF - formerly Claymore 
S&P Global Water Index ETF  
CGW 51 S&P Global Water NR Index 
(22 Feb 2007) 
CGW consists of approximately 50 equity securities selected based on investment and other criteria, from a universe of companies 
listed on global developed market exchanges. The Fund is designed to have a balanced representation from different segments of the 
water industry consisting of two clusters: 25 water utilities and infrastructure companies and 25 water equipment and materials 
companies based upon Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ industry classification. The fund will invest at least 90% of its total assets in 
common stock and American Depositary receipts that comprise the index depositary receipts representing common stocks included in 
the Index.  
Guggenheim Solar ETF - 
formerly Claymore/MAC 
TAN 28 MAC Global Solar Energy 
Index  
TAN consists of approximately 25 stocks selected based on the relative importance of solar power within the Company’s business 
model, as determined by MAC Indexing LLC. The Fund is designed to track companies within the business segments of the solar 
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Global Solar Energy Index ETF  (15 Apr 2008) energy industry, which include companies that produce solar power equipment and products for end users, companies that produce 
fabrication products (such as the equipment used by solar cell and module producers to manufacture solar power equipment) or services 
(such as companies specializing in the solar cell manufacturing or the provision of consulting services to solar cell and module 
producers) for solar power equipment producers.  
Huntington Ecological Strategy 
ETF (IPO - 20 Jun 2012) 
HECO 50  HECO is an actively managed exchange-traded fund and, under normal conditions, will invest at least 80% of its net assets in the 
exchange-listed equity securities of ecologically-focused companies 
iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social 
ETF - formerly iShares FTSE 
KLD 400 Social Index Fund  
DSI 398 MSCI KLD 400 Social Index 
(02 Jan 2007) 
DSI consists of approximately 400 companies identified by MSCI from the universe of companies included in the MSCI USA IMI 










iShares S&P Global Clean 
Energy Index Fund  
ICLN 32 iShares S&P Global Clean 
Energy Index (24 Jun 2008) 
ICLN includes clean energy production companies, clean energy equipment and technology providers. For these purposes, the “clean 
energy” universe includes biofuel and biomass, ethanol and fuel alcohol, geothermal energy, hydroelectricity, solar and wind energy. 
Market Vectors – Solar Energy 
ETF 
KWT 33 Ardour Solar Energy Index 
(SOLRX) 
(31 Dec 2004) 
KWT invests in a portfolio of securities that generally replicates SOLRX. SOLRX calculated and maintained by Dow Jones Indexes on 
behalf of Ardour Global Indexes LLC. The fund provides exposure to publicly traded companies from around the world that derive at 
least 66% of their revenues from solar power and related products and services. On a weighted basis, the companies in the fund derive 
in excess of 90% of their revenues from the solar industry.  
Market Vectors Environmental 
Services Index Fund  
EVX 27 NYSE Arca Environmental 
Services Index 
(31 Dec 2003) 
EVX consists of publicly traded companies that are involved in the management, removal and storage of consumer waste and industrial 
by-products and related environmental services. The fund is passively managed and may not hold each index component in the same 
weighting as the index. The fund may not exactly replicate the performance of the index. 
Market Vectors Global 
Alternative Energy ETF Trust  
GEX 30 Ardour Global Index (Extra 
Liquid) Index 
(01 Jan 2001) 
GEX tracks the overall performance of a global universe of listed companies engaged in the alternative energy industry. The Fund 
comprises a globally diversified group of companies engaged in the production of alternative fuels and/or related technologies. 
Companies eligible for inclusion should be engaged in the alternative energy industry with market cap exceeding $100 million and 
should have three-month average daily trading price greater than $1 per share. 
PowerShares Cleantech 
Portfolio  
PZD 60 Cleantech Index 
(31 Dec 1999) 
PZD invests at least 90% of its total assets in securities that comprise the Index and American Depository Receipts (ADR) based on the 
stocks in the index. The Fund invests in securities, such as consumer discretionary, health care, industrials, materials, utilities and 
information technology. The initial value was 500 at market close, 31 Dec 1999. 
PowerShares Global Clean 
Energy Portfolio 
 
PBD 97 WilderHill New Energy 
Global Innovation Index 
(01 Jan 2006) 
PBD invests at least 90% of its total assets in the equity securities that comprise the Index and American Depository receipts (ADR) that 
are based on the securities in the index. The Index seeks to deliver capital appreciation and is composed of companies that focus on 
greener and generally renewable sources of energy and technologies facilitating cleaner energy. The Fund will invest in consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, energy, industrials, information technology, materials and utilities sectors. 
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PowerShares Global Water 
Portfolio 
PIO 36 NASDAQ OMX Global 
Water Index (13 Jun 2007) 
PIO invests at least 90% of its total assets in the equity securities that comprise the Index and American Depository receipts (ADR) that 
are based on the securities in the index.  
PowerShares Water Resources 
Portfolio  
PHO 29 NASDAQ OMX US Water 
Index (06 Dec 2005) 
PHO invests at least 90% of its total assets in common stocks that comprise the underlying index. The index seeks to track the 
performance of the U.S. exchange-listed companies that create products designed to conserve and purify water for homes, business and 
industries. The fund invests in the sector such as industrials, utilities, healthcare, information technology and materials.  
PowerShares WilderHill 
Progressive Energy Portfolio  
PUW 55 WilderHill Progressive 
Energy Index (13 Oct 2006) 
PUW invests at least 90% of its total assets in common stocks that comprise the index. The index is comprised the United States-listed 
companies that are involved in transitional energy bridge technologies, with an emphasis on improving the use of fossil fuels. The fund 
invests in the sectors, such as consumer discretionary, industrial, information technology, materials, utilities, energy and consumer 
staples.  
PowerShares WilderHill Clean 
Energy Portfolio 
PBW 51 WilderHill Clean Energy 
Index (16 Aug 2004) 
PBW invests at least 90% of its total assets in common stocks that comprise the index. The index is designed to deliver capital 
appreciation through the selection of companies that focus on greener and generally renewable sources of energy and technologies that 
facilitate cleaner energy. The fund invests in the sectors, such as consumer discretionary, industrial, information technology, materials, 
utilities, energy and consumer staples.  
 
 
